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ON TERRITORIALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY:
SYSTEM SHOCK AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICE OF LAW
Aaron D. Twerski*
INTRODUCTION
I have not taUght conflict of laws for the past two years. I con-
fess that after twelve years with the subject, I believed that I was
suffering from "burn out." The symptoms were there: My attitude
toward the judicial decisions shifted from sharply critical to sardonic
and cynical. It seemed that interest analysis had become a game,
with little intellectual integrity. The work product of the courts did
not reflect the marvelously balanced and mature thinking of David
Cavers' nor the brutal honesty of Brainard Currie. In fact, few
* Visiting Professor, Boston University School of Law, Professor of Law, Hofstra Univer-
sity. B.S., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Marquette University. The Author gratefully ac-
knowledges the assistance of Shlomo Twerski, a member of the Hofstra Law Review.
1. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHoICE-oF-LAw PROCESS (1965); Cavers, Cipolla and
Conflicts Justice, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 360 (1971); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-Of-Law Prob-
lem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933). Professor Cavers' writing demonstrates a serious concern
that interest analysis may lead to the adoption of a "personal law" which would operate in
derogation of territorial considerations. D. CAVERs, supra, at 135, 150-59, 293, 299-300, 303.
My territorial bias is a good bit stronger than that of Professor Cavers. See Twerski, Enlight-
ened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 373
(1971).
2. All the scholarly criticism of the work of Professor Currie notwithstanding, his work
so devastated traditional theory that it became the catalytic agent for a revolution in conflicts
law. For a collection of some of his more influential works, see B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). Although he has been understandably viewed as heavily
doctrinaire, see, e.g., Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78
MICH. L. REV. 392, 395-97 (1980); von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodol-
ogy, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 933-41 (1975); Twerski, Book Review, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
1045, 1049-51 (1976), Currie demonstrated a willingness to make peace with common sense
decisions. He did so even though this jeopardized the foundations of his theoretical structure.
Thus, his reading of Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1961), as a "moderate and restrained interpretation" of forum law, Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 757 (1963), was widely perceived as a breach
of his insistence that courts should not weigh interests. See, e.g., Cavers, The Changing
Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 732, 734 n.9; von
Mehren, supra, at 940. Nor did Currie flinch from abandoning his supposed plaintiff bias
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courts appeared to be taking the subject seriously. A heavy dose of
state chauvinism bolstered at times by reliance on the "better rule of
law" approach had turned one of the most intellectually exciting ar-
eas of the law into an arid wasteland.3 It became difficult to take the
subject seriously when the courts treated it in a cavalier fashion.
Silly interest analysis seemed to be an affront to the important juris-
prudential problems which underlie choice of law and an insult to
the political structure of federalism. A respite was clearly in order.
Having committed myself to teaching conflicts again this year, I
had hoped that I would find that the "silly season" had come to a
close and that the subject was being accorded the honor and dignity
that it deserved. There was good reason for optimism. The United
States Supreme Court had indicated in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson," and Rush v. Savchuk,5 that, at least with regard
to the law of personal jurisdiction, the due process clause placed re-
strictions on the heretofore unbridled exercise of power by state
courts.' It would not have taken a herculean effort to have placed
when he believed that to do so would result in "unprincipled eclecticism." D. CAVERS, supra
note 1, at 38. For a discussion of Bernkrant, see note 35 infra.
3. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856
(1973); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977); Milkovich v.
Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Gagne v. Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624
(1972); Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973); Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657,
306 A2d 808 (1973); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157'N.W.2d 579 (1968).
It should be noted that Professor Leflar has cautioned against automatic application of
forum law through utilization of the "better rule of law" approach. See Leflar, Choice-Influ-
encing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 298 (1966).
4. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
5. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
6. World-Wide Volkswagen reiterated the dual themes which have formed the Court's
traditional grounds for restraining state court jurisdiction-fairness to the defendants and limi-
tations on state sovereignty. Of the two, it is clear that state sovereignty considerations
predominated:
[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdic-
tional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution. . . . [T]he framers . . . intended that the
States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn,
implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States-a limitation express
or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
444 U.S. at 293. The Court then noted: "Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience . . . the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism,
may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment." Id. at 294
(emphasis added). This appears to be the consensus of both those who agree and disagree with
the opinion. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 84-85; Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
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analogous restrictions on the more outrageously chauvinistic choice-
of-law process. 7 There was certainly a widespread belief in the trade
that the Supreme Court had not granted certiorari in Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Hague" in order to affirm the decision of the Minnesota
court.'
The educated prognosticators, myself included, were wrong.
Why the Court capitulated to unrestrained state chauvinism is any-
one's guess.10 The Court probably surrendered because it did not be-
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1112, 1118-20 (1981). Professor
Redish's analysis is particularly revealing since he finds no historical support for the proposi-
tion that the due process clause was intended to serve as an instrument of federalism. Id. at
1120-33. It is clear that Redish would not support the denial of jurisdiction in World-Wide
Volkswagen on "fairness to the defendant" grounds alone. Id. at 1137-42.
Since it is the thesisof this article that state sovereignty considerations expressed in terri-
torial terms should severely limit the application of interest analysis to cases arising from
heavily localized fact patterns, it is necessary to comment briefly on Professor Redish's thesis
that interstate federalism considerations have no constitutional basis. There are differing views
as to the importance of finding an explicit textual reference in the Constitution to support
limitations on state power due to federalism. I agree with the position that even absent the due
process clause, the inherent structure of a federal union imposes constitutional limitations on
the extraterritorial reach of a state's jurisdictional power. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-23 (1969); Brilmayer, supra, at 85; Monaghan,
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1, 13 n.72 (1975).
7. Numerous commentators have made the point that the consequences of a choice-of-
law decision have equal or greater impact than the mere assertion of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872, 880 (1980); Reese,
Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1589-92 (1978); Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 82 (1978). It is thus difficult to under-
stand how sovereignty/territoriality considerations which were so crucial to the World-Wide
Volkswagen rationale were almost totally disregarded in Hague. See Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
8. 444 U.S. 1070 (1980), granting cert. to 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978).
9. See Martin, supra note 6, at 887-88. The broad consensus of articles in this sympo-
sium indicate disapproval of the decision in Hague. In any event, my informal discussions with
colleagues in the conflicts field prior to the Supreme Court's disposition of Hague uncovered a
strong sentiment that the case would be reversed.
10. The plurality did state "that for a state's substantive law to be selected in a constitu-
tionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggrega-
tion of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair." 449 U.S. at 312-13 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.). The application of this test to the facts in Hague, however, leaves little hope
that constitutional control of choice of law is anything but a mirage. In aggregating the Min-
nesota contacts in Hague, the Court recognized interests that interest analysts themselves have
discounted. Elsewhere in this symposium, Professors von Mehren and Trautman demonstrate
that none of the three general conflicts approaches justify the Hague decision. See von Mehren
& Trautman, Constitutional Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 35, 39-44 (1981). Professor Weintraub, who accepts the Court's result, does so
by elevating the after-acquired residence contact to prominence, with the other interests cast in
supporting roles. See Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of
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lieve that any of the analytical tools available for resolving the prob-
lem" were capable of curbing the excesses in the numerous choice-
of-law approaches in vogue today without creating total havoc in the
field. Further, there was good reason to treat constitutional choice-
of-law questions with caution. Ill considered decisions in this area
have haunted the reputations of even the most illustrious Justices of
the Court.' 2 I believe, however, that the Court was wrong and that it
could have found any number of stratagems to strike down the Min-
nesota court's application of its own law.13 Even if the Supreme
Court was unprepared to reach this decision, it would have been far
better for the Court to have thrown up its hands in despair, conced-
ing that it was unable to restrain interest analysis. Instead, the Court
took the position that it would invalidate the choice of law of a state
which had "no significant contact . ..creating state interests,"14
Law?, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 24-31 (1981). Yet, the plurality itself refrains from such heavy
reliance on this interest. 449 U.S. at 318-19 (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates,
299 U.S. 178 (1936)).
Finally, the denial of certiorari in Rosenthal v. Warren, 414 U.S. 856, denying cert. to
475 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), gives additional weight to the conclusion that even the most
localized fact patterns will not impose limitations on choice of law. In Rosenthal, a New York
federal court ignored a Massachusetts limited recovery wrongful death statute in favor of un-
limited recovery under New York law despite the fact that the defendant was a Massachusetts
doctor whose malpractice was performed in a Massachusetts hospital. For a different perspec-
tive on Rosenthal, see Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation? Federal
Choice of Law After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103, 110-14
(1981).
11. See, e.g., Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of
Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976); Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 151 (1976); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
185 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Martin, Constitutional Limitations]; Reese, supra note 6;
Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law,
44 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1959).
12. Justice Holmes wrote that "the Constitution and the first principles of legal thinking
allow the law of the place where a contract is made to determine the validity and the conse-
quences of the act." Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 214 (1922); see, e.g.,
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1934);
N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1918). Justice Brandeis, who dissented in
Dodge, id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), was the author of the Court's opinion in Bradford
Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
13. The plurality could merely have declined to aggregate contacts which admittedly,
see 449 U.S. at 319 (post-occurrence change of residence insufficient by itself) or conceivably,
see Id. at 320 n.29 (no view expressed as to sufficiency of other contacts) were insufficient
contacts when standing alone. Indeed, the arguments in favor of each of the three stated inter-
ests are so strained that the reader is left puzzled as to why the Court felt compelled to reach
the decision it did, unless the Court intended to signal state courts that it desired to wash its
hands of constitutional control of choice of law.
14. Id. at 308.
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and proceeded to find that the most specious of interests will satisfy
constitutional demands. What the Court did was to fill the pages of
the United States Reports with some of the silliest rhetoric imagina-
ble.15 It gave dignity to arguments that would cause snickers if not
ribald laughter if expressed in any other area of the law. Only those
whose hides have been toughened by constant exposure to these non-
sensical arguments would react otherwise. The court's opinion in
Hague has left conflict of laws among those subjects which law stu-
dents have dubbed with the adjective "Mickey Mouse."
A TERRITORIAL VIEW OF THE FACTS
Ralph Hague died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle on
which he was a passenger was struck from behind by an automobile.
The accident took place in Pierce County, Wisconsin. The operator
of both the automobile and the motorcycle, as well as the decedent,
were all Wisconsin residents. At the time of the accident the dece-
dent resided in Hager City, Wisconsin, which is near the locus of the
15. See Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1
(1979). Professor Monaghan relates the following anecdote:
Taking Supreme Court opinions seriously emerged as a topic of discussion at a
lunch I attended last year with several Supreme Court law clerks. Somehow we
came round to a particular three-judge district court case which I confidently opined
was "certain" to be reversed on the basis of principles announced in prior opinions.
The clerks were models of politeness and circumspection; never once did they even
intimate that the judgment would (by divided vote) be affirmed. But shortly after I
had announced my views of that case, one of the clerks began to prod me, asking
whether I simply took the Court's opinions "too seriously." I allowed that I had
been around long enough to recognize that my notions of principled adjudication
had all they could do to survive in the Supreme Court, given the force of the con-
flicting pressures on that body. Turning to a former student, I then engaged in what
I thought to be an outstanding example of the Socratic dialogue:
Q: When you were on the law review, did you take seriously what was said in
Supreme Court opinions?
A: Yes.
Q: When you spent the summer clerking for the X firm, did you take-seriously
what was said in Supreme Court opinions?
A: Yes.
Q: When you clerked on the Court of Appeals, did you take seriously what was
said in Supreme Court opinions?
A: Yes.
Q: When you go into practice next year, will you take seriously what is said in'
Supreme Court Opinions?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you think it is a little odd that the only institution that does not take
seriously what is said in Supreme Court opinions is the Supreme Court itself?
A: (A smile).
Id. at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
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accident."" Neither the operator of the motorcycle nor the operator
of the automobile carried valid insurance,'7 but fortunately for the
decedent's wife, Wisconsin law mandated uninsured motorists cover-
age.18 The decedent was the owner of three cars, all insured by All-
state under insurance contracts entered into in Wisconsin. The unin-
sured motorist coverage was limited to $15,000 for each automobile.
Mrs. Hague argued that the uninsured motorist coverage for all
three automobiles should be stacked, permitting her to recover
$45,000 against the insurance company.19 The insurance contract,
however, had a provision which disallowed stacking, and at the time
the provision was drafted, Wisconsin law upheld the right of insurers
to contract for antistacking clauses.20
If at this point the widow were to suggest that the antistacking
clause be invalidated because the neighboring state of Minnesota
would strike down the clause, one would raise one's eyebrows and
ask, "So what? What has that got to do with this case?" Mrs.
Hague would respond that the Minnesota rule should prevail be-
cause (1) her husband commuted to work in Minnesota for fifteen
years; (2) the defendant insurance company was doing business in
Minnesota; and (3) subsequent to the death of her husband, Mrs.
Hague married a Minnesota resident and moved to Minnesota.
Had I been judging this case, I would have reacted in the fol-
lowing manner: I would have first wished Mrs. Hague a hearty
Mazel Tov on her remarriage, fairly certain that she did not choose
a husband based on his home state's laws relating to stacking. I
would have been totally unimpressed with the fact that Allstate was
doing business in Minnesota, since Allstate was doing business in all
fifty states, and its business in Minnesota was totally unrelated to
the Wisconsin insurance contracts. Finally, I would have questioned
the relevance of Mr. Hague's employment to his Wisconsin insur-
ance contracts.
THE AFFECTED INTERESTS
I will not expend any energy analyzing the argument that doing
business in a state is grounds for application of that state's law.
16. 289 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1978), a fd on rehearing, id. at 50 (Minn. 1979), a fd,
449 U.S. 302 (1981).
17. Id. at 45.
18. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(4) (West 1980).
19. 289 N.W.2d at 45.
20. See Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974).
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Whatever is to be said in favor of jurisdiction based on generally
affiliating circumstances,2' there is nothing to be said for it as a
choice-of-law principle. No scholar has, to my knowledge, supported
such an approach. 2 The less said about it the better.
The employment relationship and the post-accident change of
domicile deserve more serious discussion because they point to inter-
ests which have been accorded weight by both courts and scholars.2 3
Interest analysts argue that a state has an interest worthy of having
its law applied when there will be social consequences in the state or
when the state will in some way be affected. The Hague plurality
found that this approach has constitutional significance:
That Mr. Hague was not killed while commuting to work or
while in Minnesota does not dictate a different result. To hold that
the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of Minnesota law violated
the Constitution for that reason would require too narrow a view of
Minnesota's relationship with the parties and the occurrence giving
rise to the litigation. An automobile accident need not occur within
a particular jurisdiction for that jurisdiction to be connected to the
21. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In regard to the
possibility of limitations on Perkins imposed by the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977), see Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979). For a pre-
Shaffer analysis of Perkins, see von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1178-79 (1966).
22. See generally Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between
State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1320 (1981); Silberman, supra note 6, at 97-
98.
23. Post-occurrence change of residence was raised in Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1967); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968); Haines v.
Mid-Century Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970). It was taken into account as
a factor in applying forum law in both Miller and Haines. Several scholars have argued that it
may legitimately be considered when applying interest analysis. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 6.28 (2d ed. 1980); Sedler, The Governmental Interest
Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181,
241-42 (1977); Note, Post Transaction or Occurrence Events in Conflict of Laws, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 843, 865 (1968).
The employment relationship giving rise to a supposed interest in the welfare of Minne-
sota employees, conferring upon them the benefits of Minnesota's antistacking policy, has not
to my knowledge ever been stretched to create a legally cognizable multistate interest. Ana-
logues in conflicts literature are, however, not hard to find. Courts have given credence to
interests that are equally implausible. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Burger, 102 Cal. App. 3d 795,
802, 162 Cal. Rptr. 564, 568 (1980) (California held Mexico has interest in limiting liability
of California drivers in order to increase tourist trade in case of Mexican plaintiff injured in
Mexico by California driver); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463 (1965). (New York suggested Colorado had interest in applying its host-guest rule to
grant injured parties in other cars priority over ungrateful guests). See generally B. CURRIE,
supra note 2, at 703-04; Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 1327 n.60.
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occurrence. Similarly, the occurrence of a crash fatal to a Minne-
sota employee in another state is a Minnesota contact. If Mr.
Hague had only been injured and missed work for a few weeks the
effect on the Minnesota employer could have been palpable and
Minnesota's interest in having its employee made whole would be
evident. Mr. Hague's death affects Minnesota's interest still more
acutely, even though Mr. Hague will not return to the Minnesota
workforce. Minnesota's workforce is surely affected by the level of
protection the State extends to it, either directly or indirectly. Vin-
dication of the rights of the estate of a Minnesota employee, there-
fore, is an important state concern.24
Similarly, with regard to Mrs. Hague's post-accident change of dom-
icile, the Court said:
Respondent's residence and subsequent appointment in Minnesota
as personal representative of her late husband's estate constitute a
Minnesota contact which gives Minnesota an interest in respon-
dent's recovery, an interest which the court below identified as full
compensation for "resident accident victims" to keep them "off
welfare rolls" and able "to meet financial obligations. '25
My initial reaction to these arguments is that they are pure un-
adulterated foolishness. They were manufactured to meet the exigen-
cies of the case, and were limited only by the imagination of counsel
and by the guile of the Court. The Supreme Court could have said
as much and dismissed these arguments as sheer sophistry.26 The
Court need not be taken for the town fool. 27 Wisconsin law clearly
had claim to application, and should not have been set aside by argu-
ments which were devoid of elementary common sense. If federalism
and state sovereignty are issues to be dealt with seriously by the
24. 449 U.S. at 314-15 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 319 (quoting 289 N.W.2d at 49).
26. If the Minnesota court sought to apply its antistacking policy to favor a plaintiff who
stayed for one night in a Minnesota motel on the premise that it would assure payment of
Minnesota motel bills, I believe that the Supreme Court would not recognize such a policy as a
valid multistate interest to oust the otherwise applicable Wisconsin law, even if Minnesota
considered payment of motel bills a legitimate domestic interest. Professor Brilmayer has
sought to develop a litmus test for the validity of states' assertions of interest. For an evalua-
tion of her position, see text accompanying notes 42-63 infra.
27. Although there was mention made of the employment relationship in the Minnesota
Supreme Court opinion, 289 N.W.2d at 47, the Minnesota court did not develop the notion
that the "well being of its workplace" was affected. Thus, the United States Supreme Court
was responsible for creating this interest out of whole cloth. Commentators have questioned
the appropriateness of the Court's creating interests when the state had not done so. See, e.g.,
Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 1319-20; Weintraub, supra note 10.
[Vol. 10:149
TERRITORIALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
Supreme Court in a choice-of-law case, the Court should demand
palpable reasons rather than empty verbalizations before setting
aside the law of the only state that had any apparent claim to appli-
cation. Nevertheless, let us assume that Minnesota's interests truly
were affected. Should that alone be a sufficient basis for the applica-
tion of Minnesota's law?
Consider the following hypothetical. I am a visiting professor at
Boston University Law School on leave for the year from Hofstra
University Law School. When I accepted the visitorship at Boston
University, I did so with the understanding that I would be commut-
ing from New York. Several nights each week I take lodging in a
Boston motel. The motel attracts other academics such as myself
who teach in the intellectually rich Boston area. Assume that the
room next to mine is rented to a music professor who insists on play-
ing classical jazz at 2:00 a.m. Assume further that when I moved in
I introduced myself to my neighbor and told him that I was a New
York domiciliary; he informed me that he too hailed from the Em-
pire State.
Assume that as a result of my neighbor's noisemaking I become
irritable and crotchety. When I return home to New York I become
impossible to live with for two days until I get enough sleep. Assume
further that Massachusetts does not recognize a cause of action for
loss of consortium arising from nuisance actions, but that New York
does. Would it be legitimate for New York to apply its own law to
this case simply because New York's interests are affected? 28 I
28. Those commentators who would treat common domicile (or domicile with similar
laws) as false conflicts cases would disagree with the suggestion that it would be unconstitu-
tional for New York to apply its consortium rule to the Massachusetts based injury. See D.
CAVERS, supra note 1, at 148-59; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 23, §§ 6.9-6.12, at 280-91. See
generally e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972).
Rule one of Neumeler provides that in host-guest cases, the law of the common domicile
shall govern. Although the Neumeier rules are not necessarily dispositive in non-host-guest
situations, they do reflect a strong opinion that the common domicile problem can be resolved
by a simple rule. See Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315,
319, 333-34 (1972); cf. Twerski, Neumeler v. Kuehner: Where Are the Emperor's Clothes, 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 104, 108 (1973).
Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967) has interesting
ramifications for the resolution of the hypothetical offered in text. In Casey, the plaintiff and
her husband were domiciled in Oregon, a loss of consortium jurisdiction. The plaintiff was
injured on an employment project in Washington; the defendants were both corporations lo-
cated in Washington, a no loss of consortium jurisdiction. The defendants were also licensed to
do business in Oregon. The court could have sought to treat the Washington corporation,
which did business in Oregon, as a partial Oregon domiciliary. It did not. Instead it focused on
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would think not, even though the likelihood is that the interests of
New York are truly implicated: When I don't get a good night's
sleep I am not to be lived with, and if this were to happen week after
week, New York's interest in domestic tranquility could be seriously
affected. Why then should it be unconstitutional to apply New York
law to grant loss of consortium recovery for nuisance?
In order to answer this question, it would be helpful to step
back a bit and take note of the distance that has been traveled in
choice-of-law thinking over the past several decades. In the 30's and
40's, when the thinking of the first Restatement was dominant, Cook
and Cavers professed that it was unwise to determine the application
of law to a given set of interstate facts without examining the policy
of the supposedly conflicting laws.29 There was much to be learned
by examining how the policies behind the conflicting laws related to
the facts of the case at bar. This approach thereby added a policy
dimension to the analysis of interstate fact-law patterns.
In Hague we have come full circle, as the decision evidences an
approach to the choice-of-law process that subordinates considera-
the heavily localized activity of the defendant in this case. Since the construction project was
Washington based, the court found that Washington had a substantial interest in applying its
law denying recovery to conform with the defendant's legitimate expectations. The court's lan-
guage is instructive:
Washington has a legitimate concern with whether her residents engaged in a con-
struction job there-in this-case a job related to the public interest-should be dis-
appointed in their reasonable expectation that the extent of their liability for negli-
gent conduct in Washington be governed by the law of that state, regardless of the
domicile of the injured plaintiff.
Id. at 291, 428 P.2d at 906 (emphasis added). The court was concerned with the expectation
that the law of a state in which localized activity had taken place should govern, whatever that
law may be. Since loss of consortium is primarily a derivative damages issue, it cannot affect
expectations at the primary behavior level. If this line of reasoning were to be followed, the
strong Massachusetts localization of the fact pattern in the hypothetical would demand the
application of Massachusetts law. But see D. CAVERS, supra note 1, at 156-57. It is difficult to
evaluate the Oregon court's opinion of the role that the localization of the events would play in
its decision in Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 455, 506 P.2d 494 (1973). In Erwin, the defendants
were Oregon residents while the plaintiff and her injured husband were Washingtonians. The
accident occurred in Washington. The Oregon court decided that neither Oregon nor Wash-
ington had a vital interest in applying its own law. As a matter of convenience, Oregon law,
granting recovery, was applied. Id. at 458-60, 506 P.2d at 496-97. There is no indication in
Erwin whether the facts were heavily localized in Washington or whether there was nothing
more than a two-vehicle crash in Washington.
It should be noted that the more dated authority focused on the place of injury rather
than the impact on the marital relations. See, e.g., Sesito v. Krop, 297 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961);
Jordan v. States Marine Corp., 257 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1958); McVickers v. Chesapeake 0.
Ry., 194 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
29. See D. CAVERS, supra note 1; W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1942).
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tion of the facts of the case to consideration of state interests and
policies. Before the conflicts revolution, we were prepared to analyze
choice-of-law cases without paying significant attention to policy.
Today we are prepared to talk about social policy and how law af-
fects interests of states without paying significant attention to the
interstate fact pattern. This approach raises serious constitutional
problems. State sovereignty implies a right of a state legal system to
govern essentially local disputes. A dispute does not change from
local to interstate in nature merely because effects will be felt in
other jurisdictions. In a federal system which provides for a constitu-
tional right of free travel and which zealously protects interstate
commerce, there is almost no local transaction that does not have
some interstate ramifications. To say, therefore, that all interstate
ramifications that can be expressed in the form of some state interest
are sufficient to create a choice-of-law question would establish in-
sanity as the norm for all litigation. Such is not the way of the
world. In short, I believe that before a court can apply interest anal-
ysis it must have before it a case which is not essentially local in
character.
It has been my contention throughout that some cases are so
heavily centered in one jurisdiction that they never lose their essen-
tially local character. While I have expressed this idea in different
ways, my main contention has been that expectations have to be
looked at in a perspective broader than that of the parties to the
transaction. Law is no stranger or interloper in the life of man in
society. Rather, it is an integral part of man's experience, with a
regularity and normalcy attendant to it. The conflicts case is a wild
card-a highly irregular occurrence which cannot become the norm
without seriously disturbing the regular operation and expectancies
of the legal system. The notion that any state which is affected by
the operation of another state's law may by that interest alone be-
come a potential source for the governing law means that there
exists no such thing as a local controversy clearly governable by local
law. All cases become potential conflicts cases.30
30. In a poetic mood I once observed:
When I wake in the morning I expect the sun to shine. In the evening, I expect
darkness to fall. Do these expectations have juridical significance? I believe they do.
Those positing an interest analysis would argue that their significance arises from
the fact that expectations affect conduct. I undertake certain activities with an
awareness of the amount of light that will be available to me. I suggest, however,
that expectations play a far more potent role in our life style. There is a regularity
and rhythm to life in which the familiar-the habitual plays a vital role. At times it
1981]
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It is because of this concern that the discussion of expectations
in the plurality, concurring, and .dissenting opinions in Hague is a
great disappointment to me. Noting that Mr. Hague's policy was for
automobile insurance, and that the defendant was a multistate auto-
mobile insurer, the opinions conclude that there was no unfair sur-
prise and no disappointed expectations.3 1 If, however, party expecta-
tions are alone relevant, and a court is not required to consider
expectations arising from the inherent structure of federalism, it be-
comes too easy to isolate some factor that can justify applying a
state's law. Decisions such as Hague will therefore demonstrate to
the world that no one has a right to expectations in a choice-of-law
case. And, as long as a case has some interstate ramifications, then
even localized cases have choice-of-law potential.3 2
SYSTEM SHOCK
If state sovereignty implies an ability to control the legal result
of essentially local controversies, then events that are centered from
genesis to conclusion within the geographical limits-of one sovereign
cannot casually be removed from the lawmaking domain of that sov-
ereign. The presumption is clearly in favor of the territorial result.
Separating the law from the flesh and blood of the case would de-
affects conduct but even when it does not affect conduct, it affects our sense of
tranquillity [sic]. A meteor streaking along in the sky thousands of miles from us is
of interest because it is a departure from the norm. We can take this departure from
the norm with a fair degree of equanimity. If, however, we should go outside on a
clear night in which the moon is clearly visible and find no stars it would upset us no
end. It would upset us not because we depend on starlight, but because we have the
right to believe in the regularity of nature.
Law is no stranger to human activity. If we live in a world of nature-we also
live in a world of law. A Delaware driver, on a trip in Delaware expects Delaware
law to apply. He may be driving a Pennsylvania guest to his home in Pennsylvania
but his expectations prior and subsequent to any accident is [sic] that whatever the
Delaware law may be it will apply to him. It is immaterial whether it affects his
conduct. People have a right to expect a regularity and rhythm from the law. If this
is what those who argue for certainty as a conflict of law value are concerned with
then they have a point in their favor.
Twerski, supra note 1, at 381-82 (footnote omitted). See also von Mehren, supra note 2, at
945.
31. 449 U.S. at 317-18 (plurality opinion), 329-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judg-
ment), 336 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. It would have been helpful if the Court had focused on the expectation question as I
have defined it. That would have highlighted the essentially local nature of the controversy and
raised the question whether the application of Minnesota law meets the minimum standards of
what Professor von Mehren has rightly called "comprehensibility." von Mehren, supra note 2,
at 945.
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mean the authority and dignity of the sovereign in which the events
took place. Anyone who has ever taught conflict of laws will agree
that interest analysis accomplishes just that result. We all know too
well the disbelief with which interest analysis is received by students.
It takes several classes to convince them that the considerations
which today have become standard fare are to be treated seriously.
The credibility gap stems, in my opinion, from their inability to ac-
cept the idea that a sovereign could have its lawmaking authority
over a controversy, which has transpired within its geographical
bounds, so facilely removed.
Consider the following fact pattern as an example of this point:
Marcia and Catherina, both New York residents, were students at
Michigan State University; they met for the first time when they
were assigned to be roommates in the dormitory. Several months
into the school semester they decided to take a weekend trip to De-
troit. Enroute they were involved in an automobile accident. Immedi-
ately following the accident the police took Catherina and Marcia to
a Michigan hospital, where Catherina died as a result of the injuries
she suffered in the crash. Marcia was driving at the time of the acci-
dent; the car was registered and insured in New York. Under New
York law a guest may recover from a host driver by proving ordinary
negligence on the part of the driver. In Michigan there is a guest
statute in force which requires that a guest prove willful misconduct
or gross negligence in order to recover. Since the case involved a
potential reckless homicide, the police investigated and found that
Marcia was merely negligent and that criminal charges could not be
brought.
Those familiar with conflicts cases will recognize a striking sim-
ilarity between these facts and Tooker v. Lopez.3 3 The majority in
Tooker held that New York law governed, finding that the case was
a false conflict with Michigan law having no claim to application."
It is hard to imagine a greater insult to the sovereignty of Michigan.
The set of events was wholly contained within Michigan: The stu-
dents had oriented their lives in Michigan for a rather long period of
time, they had begun their trip and were to have ended it in Michi-
gan, and Michigan had a statute on point. Further, the legal order of
33. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1969). Conflicts cognoscenti
will readily recognize that the hypothetical varies somewhat from the actual facts in Tooker.
They were changed to help dramatize the territorial implications of the case. The changed
facts would in no way have altered the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals.
34. Id. at 576, 249 N.E.2d at 398, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
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Michigan had been involved in the case in many ways, including a
police investigation of the crash, consideration of criminal prosecu-
tion, and a decision that the driver had not acted recklessly.35 And
yet the New York law, granting a recovery, was applied. The notion
that New York domiciliaries can bring their legal rights along with
them to another jurisdiction, even for a relationship which did not
have its origin in New York, presents the spectacle of two individu-
als who meet for the first time in Michigan and form a temporary
government in exile for the purpose of avoiding the Michigan host-
guest statute. No intellectualization of hypothetical or real interests
can overcome the facts in this case.
I find the assault on sovereignty to be so extreme and the corre-
sponding shock to the expectations of the legal system so onerous in
Tooker that the full faith and credit clause is brought into play.36
For the same reason, I believe that sovereign shock demands the re-
sult in Bernkrant v. Fowler,37 and the reversal of such cases as
35. In the hypothetical variant set forth, the Michigan police investigated whether the
driver was reckless or merely negligent. Although the purpose of this investigation was to
determine criminal liability rather than civil responsibility, the State still examined the very
conduct relevant to the issue of host-guest recovery. There is nothing logically inconsistent
with this aspect of the conduct being of interest to Michigan in the criminal context and
irrelevant to it in the civil context. Under interest analysis, criminal liability would focus on
the conduct of the defendant, a matter which Michigan has a clear interest in regulating. The
civil action, however, focuses not on conduct qua conduct, but as a predicate to recovery. Since
Michigan does not seek to protect insurers who have covered New York domiciliaries from
potential collusive action, there is no reason to prevent recovery. Nonetheless, there is a touch
of irony in Michigan, the locus of the accident, investigating the very conduct which it believes
should be the sole element for determining recovery and finding that it is absent from the
scene, and then contending that it has no interest in the civil side of that issue. See Twerski,
supra note 28, at 110 (host-guest issue may have regulatory purpose).
36. There has been much discussion on whether the due process clause or full faith and
credit clause should govern issues of federalism. See note 6 supra. My own predilection is for
the full faith and credit clause which is a superior tool for controlling questions dealing with
the inherent structure of federalism. Accord, Martin, Constitutional Limitations. supra note
11, at 186. But see Kirgis, supra note 11, at 150 (both due process and full faith and credit
clauses provide meaningful choice-of-law limitations).
37. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). I do not mean to suggest
that if California had a true procedural policy. that it could not refuse to enforce the oral
contract in Bernkrant. It is my intent, however, to disagree with Justice Traynor when he
states: "We have no doubt that California's interest in protecting estates being probated here
from false claims based on alleged oral contracts to make wills is constitutionally sufficient to
justify the legislature's making our statute of frauds applicable to all such contracts sought to
be enforced against such estates." Id. at 594, 360 P.28 at 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269 (citations
omitted).
It will be recalled that Bernkrant was decided on two possible fact patterns: (1) all parties
were domiciled in Nevada when the oral contract to make a will wai made, id.; and (2) the
defendant was a California domiciliary at the time of the contract. Id. at 596, 360 P.2d at 910,
[Vol. 10:149
TERRITORIALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
Rosenthal v. Warren,38 Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 9 and Blamey v.
Brown.40 It goes without saying that I also believe that Hague was a
constitutionally unsound decision.
There is another reason that helps buttress this conclusion.
There has been much discussion in the literature and the judicial
opinions of the hypothetical and highly ephemeral nature of the
interests which support application of forum law.41 Professor
Brilmayer has recently suggested that in reviewing choice-of-law de-
cisions, the Supreme Court should not address the sufficiency of any
given interest, but should rather address the simple existence of the
interest at the domestic level.42 She argues convincingly that the fail-
ure to do this will turn constitutional control of choice of law into a
mockery.43 Constitutional law would be at the mercy of state courts
12 Cal. Rptr. at 270. Under either of these alternatives it is clear that the entire transaction
was centered in Nevada and that only its law had a claim to application.
To clarify my position, if the law-fact pattern were reversed so that the entire transaction
was centered in California, and the defendant then moved to Nevada where oral contracts to
make a will are valid, I would argue that the contract must be invalidated and that such a
result would be constitutionally mandated. See Twerski, Choice-of-Law in Contracts-Some
Thoughts on the Weintraub Approach, 57 IOWA L. REv. 1239, 1240-42 (1972). This hypo-
thetical variant of Bernkrant squarely raises the substantive choice-of-law question since Ne-
vada, the enforcing state, has no statute of frauds. It thus has no procedural policy to rely on.
If California's statute of frauds has substantive goals, then by enforcing the contract it would
be setting aside the only territorially applicable law. See Cavers, Oral Contracts to Provide By
Will and the Choice-of-Law Process: Some Notes on Bernkrant, in PERSPEcTIvES OF
LAw-EssAys FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT 38, 60 (R. Pound, E. Griswold & A. Sutherland
eds. 1964).
38. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). Professor Reese also
believed that Rosenthal was wrongly decided. Reese, supra note 6, at 1605.
39. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). See also Reese, supra note 6, at 1597.
40. 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
41. Professor Rosenberg's strong statement on this topic remains to this day unrebutted
by the interest analysts. Commenting on Kell v. Henderson, 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552
(1966), he said:
Searching for governmental interests presupposes that the purposes behind sub-
stantive rules are so clear, so singular, so unequivocal that we can hope to discover
them with some certainty and some consensus. This is at odds with reality. Even the
simple rules that raise rights and duties with regard to personal injuries are a com-
posite of thrusts and counter-thrusts of many kinds. For instance there are many
substantive rules favoring recovery for negligent injuries; but contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, workmen's compensation exclusions and other rules are
opposed to recovery. To try to bring all the huffing and puffing together into a policy
that runs clearly in one direction and that has a measurable intensity that permits
comparing it with some contrary policy is, in my judgment, pure fantasy.
Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 464 (1967); accord,
Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 559-60 (1971).
42. Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 1336.
43. Id. at 1335.
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which could create arbitrary or non-existent state interests for the
sole purpose of resolving a choice-of-law problem. For example, Pro-
fessor Brilmayer demonstrates the invalidity of Minnesota's employ-
ment interest in Hague." The connection between Mr. Hague's
Minnesota employment and the antistacking provision in the insur-
ance contract had no domestic relevance, which, she claims, is the
necessary minimum for application of interest analysis.45 Without
domestic relevance, an alleged state interest serves only to control
the result in a choice-of-law case, and thus invades the sovereignty of
another state without any implications for the forum. It is, she con-
tends, the proverbial cheap shot.4
I find it uncomfortable to criticize a fellow territorialist; we are
still so few in number that we can hardly enjoy the luxury of attack-
ing tfie work product of those in our own camp.4 7 I fail, however, to
understand why a state may not have an interest in a multistate case
which does not stem from the same source as its domestic interests.
It is one thing to say that a court must recognize bona fide domestic
interests and carefully review multistate interests to assure that
states do not carelessly disregard the interests of other states. It is
quite another to proclaim that the multistate policies of the several
states should be discounted entirely.'8 A multistate case does, after
all, involve more than one state; it raises concerns about how one is
to treat a visitor, a stranger, or a halfbreed fact pattern. Why can
Minnesota not legitimately concern itself with the employment con-
44. Id. at 1341-47.
45. Id. at 1328-33.
46. Professor Brilmayer maintains:
As in commerce clause cases, constitutional limits regarding credit to judgments,
jurisdiction, and choice of law exist because states are likely to be insufficiently
sensitive to the needs of the federal system. It would thus be inconsistent with these
limitations to give states effective authority to decide their scope. Peculiarly multi-
state policies are suspect in ways that domestic policies are not, for the political
safeguards accompanying adoption of domestic rules are absent. A state presumably
formulates its internal law after careful consideration of all sides of the issue; propo-
nents of each side are represented in the decision-making process. But there are no
similar constraints on the formulation of multistate policy. Because a state does not
bear the costs of its own overreaching, one state is unlikely to consider adequately
the federal interest in protecting the needs of others.
Id. at 1325-26 (footnote omitted). ,
47. Things are looking better for territorialists. The works of Professors Reese, Martin,
Kirgis and even perhaps Professor Silberman have a distinct territorialist cast. See Kirgis,
supra note 11; Martin, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 11; Reese, supra note 6; Silber-
man, supra note 6.
48. See Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 1326, 1335.
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tact in a multistate situation even if Minnesota would disregard that
contact in a domestic situation? Yet, Brilmayer proclaims that the
choice-of-law process only becomes operative if a state has regulated
the underlying issue at the domestic level.' 9 She ultimately perceives
a multistate interest as insufficient to justify applying a state's law
because this interest will impact on other states and their right to
control matters legitimately within their domain.50 Thus, the perti-
nent question is not whether a forum has good reason to apply its
law, but whether the application of the forum's law is an intrusion
on another state's legitimate right to govern.
In short, Professor Brilmayer argues convincingly as follows: (1)
If a contact with a state expressing an interest in a multistate case is
one which the state utilizes for the regulation of purely domestic
cases, then the interest is beyond constitutional attack.5 1 (2) The Su-
preme Court's function is to satisfy itself of the existence of such a
domestic- interest, rather than pass on the sufficiency of the inter-
est.5 2 (3) Although the Supreme Court must defer to domestic inter-
ests which are found to have objective existence, the Court cannot
constitutionally defer to a state's multistate policies; this would give
the states control over matters which are peculiarly within the prov-
ince of the Court.5 3 (4) Domestic policies must be evaluated with
care, since under modern interest analysis, domestic interests are
often multistate policies in disguise.5' Brilmayer fails, however, to
adequately answer the following questons: (1) What should be the
constitutional limits of a state's multistate policies? "5 (2) If, as
Brilmayer infers, a state's multistate policies may never go beyond
incidental domestic regulation, why is this an appropriate limitation?
(3) Why should a state with an objectively verifiable domestic inter-
est be beyond constitutional attack when another state with the same
interest, expressed as part of a multistate policy, would be in viola-
tion of the due process clause? The intrusion into the sovereignty of
the state whose law would otherwise apply would be identical in both
49. Id. at 1328-41. It should be noted that Professor Brilmayer makes allowance for
choice-of-law policy to operate within constitutional constraints, once the existence of a domes-
tic regulatory policy has been established. Id. at 1327-28.
50. Id. at 1329-30.
51. Id. at 1336.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1318-28.
54. Id. at 1328-31.
55. Brilmayer suggests that other constitutional restraints may limit choice-of-law policy
even if a domestic regulatory interest is established. Id. at 1348-49.
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cases.
I do not mean to suggest that cases can be readily found in
which states have expressed the desire to regulate at the multistate
level despite the absence of a domestic analogue.5 6 Nonetheless, the
argument is theoretically correct and of immense practical signifi-
cance since every choice-of-law case is in truth a case in which the
state has no domestic analogue. In Tooker v. Lopez, 57 why is it sig-
nificant that New York has an interest in permitting host-guest re-
56. Professor Brilmayer has called my attention to Jones v. Helms, 101 S. Ct. 2434
(1981), a case in which the Court upheld a Georgia statute which provides that a parent who
willfully and voluntarily abandons his or her dependent child is guilty of a misdemeanor, but
that those parents who commit the offense (child abandonment) within Georgia and thereafter
leave the state are guilty of a felony. The statute was attacked as an infringement of the
constitutional right to travel.
Jones bears some relevance to the issue of whether a state may have a separate cognizable
multistate interest even though it does not regulate at the domestic level. The fact that Geor-
gia penalizes extraterritorial abandonment more seriously than it does in-state abandonment
would seem to support the thesis that domestic regulation need not be the sine qua non for a
multistate interest. Indeed, the Georgia Supreme Court in Garren v. State, 245 Ga. 323, 264
S.E.2d 876 (1980), said that penalty enhancement serves "the legislative purpose of causing
parents to support their children since the General Assembly could have concluded that the
parental support obligation is more difficult to enforce if the parent charged with child aban-
donment leaves the state." Id. at 325, 264 S.E.2d at 878 (citations omitted).
Although Jones does suggest some support for my thesis, the thrust of the Court's reason-
ing was that the defendant's guilty plea to the felony was an acknowledgement that he had
committed a misdemeanor before he left Georgia. See 101 S. Ct. at 2440. The Court said that
it was aware of no authority that suggests that a person who has committed an offense punish-
able by imprisonment has an unqualified right to leave the jurisdiction prior to arrest or con-
viction. Id. By utilizing this rationale, the Court is cutting back on the multistate interest and
assimilating the fleeing with the domestic crime.
I admit that it is difficult to identify cases where multistate interests have mandated the
application of domestic law in the absence of a domestic interest. As I have indicated in text,
however, there is no reason that Minnesota could not decide to regulate out-of-state employees
on the basis of their employment contact even though it regulated domiciliaries on the basis of
non-employment contacts. Thus, for example, it might assure adherence to its automobile in-
surance coverage requirements at the domestic level by requiring all Minnesota residents to
register and insure their cars instate. It might also mandate that permanent employees, who
use their cars for daily commuting, register their cars in Minnesota and obtain the degree of
coverage required by Minnesota as a prerequisite to registration. Indeed, Minnesota's concerns
might be significantly different: For residents it might seek to provide minimum levels of pro-
tection in the best sense of state paternalism. For out-of-staters it might impose similar or
scaled down benefits to assure that the state does not have to bear the burden of their
hospitalization.
The arguments presented here are of only theoretical importance. The true difficulty with
the Brilmayer argument stems from its unwillingness to recognize that choice-of-law policies
must play an important constitutional role in limiting a state with an objectively verifiable
domestic interest from stepping on the sovereignty of another state which is the territorial
center of the events.
57. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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covery in a purely domestic case? Why should the resolution of that
question be significant in determining the legitimate reach of New
York's policy and the appropriateness of its invasion of the sover-
eignty of Michigan? Professor Brilmayer does not claim that her
thesis is the sole test for constitutional choice of law. 58 She admits
that constitutional values other than sovereignty may be implicated
and may require the preference of one state's interest over another.5 9
Nonetheless, it is quite clear that she views the domestic-relevance
test as the one which will establish the base line for sovereignty con-
cerns.60 If a state does not regulate at the domestic level it cannot
regulate at the conflicts level. However, as Professor Brilmayer has
so brilliantly demonstrated in an earlier article, 61 domestic regulation
tells us nothing about a state's interest at the conflicts level. The two
are totally unrelated. To now suggest that domestic regulation
should become the operative test for sovereignty at the conflicts level
is, if not illogical, certainly ironic. Too little information is provided
by the inquiry to make it the test for concerns which must perforce
be the primary limiting factor to prevent states from running wild
and destroying the balanced structure of a federal union.
At one point, Professor Brilmayer notes that "[e]ach state has a
prima facie right to regulate domestic contacts-person, property, or
events affiliated with the state-but a state generally has no business
regulating circumstances connected only with other states."'62 In view
of the conflicts issue, the latter half of this statement begs the ques-
tion. There is more to be gained by defining the prima facie right of
a state to regulate local controversies. The concepts of state sover-
eignty and territorial integrity are crucial to this inquiry. The solu-
tion does not lie in characterizing multistate interests as less worthy
of recognition than true domestic interests; both will have to take a
back seat to territorial considerations when a case is sufficiently lo-
calized in its facts. I believe that Professor Brilmayer will find that
the implications of her analysis will drive her further into the territo-
rialist camp.
If Professor Brilmayer were correct in her contention that the
existence of domestic interests is a necessary predicate to application
of a state's law, then she would also be correct in the methodology
58. See Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 1348-49.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 398-99.
62. Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 1330.
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she has presented for determining the existence of such domestic in-
terests. If, however, conflict or multistate interests are sufficient, and
the only prerequisite to the application of those interests is that they
be legitimate, then we face a very different problem. The source of
the problem is the application of law to a multistate fact pattern, a
unique situation which entails defining the state's interest in a multi-
state setting. There is, as yet, no simple method of verifying the le-
gitimacy of such an interest. The only check is the Supreme Court,
which has now indicated that it is not prepared to exercise this su-
pervisory power in any meaningful way. Thus, an institutional imbal-
ance exists: On the one hand, we, have solid territorial fact patterns
which implicate state sovereignty at a significant level; on the other
hand, we have interests which are inherently unverifiable.6 3 It will do
no good to point to purely doinestic cases to help verify these inter-
ests. When we seek the application of the domestic law to the multi-
state fact pattern, we are by definition facing a question not ad-
dressed by domestic law. I am not suggesting that if some method of
verification became available that the attack on state sovereignty re-
sulting from interest analysis would suddenly become palatable to
me. Rather, I only wish to point out a fact of life. State sovereignty
has been undermined by interest analysis, permitting the erosion of
the sovereign's lawmaking authority in cases in which the territorial
dimension of the case was unquestionable, and the multistate inter-
ests were both ephemeral and unverifiable.
63. My colleague, Professor Henderson, in a manuscript tentatively entitled Beyond
Fairness and Efficiency in Tort Theory: A Process Perspective (to be published in Cornell Law
Review, 1982), identifies four norms necessary for optimal adjudicative behavior in tort litiga-
tion. They are comprehensibility, verifiability, conformability, and manageability. He argues
that when litigation routinely disregards these norms it loses credibility. Henderson demon-
strates that courts limit the scope of their substantive rules by assuring themselves that such
rules do not overstep these process norms.
In regard to verifiability, Hendersoir contends that if litigants are to be given an opportu-
nity to present proofs in support of their arguments, the rules of decision must refer to facts
that can be verified objectively. Another threat to verifiability relates to the need for courts to
address "What would have happened if . . . " questions. When attention focuses on events
that never occurred and circumstances that never existed, he contends that proof gives way to
speculation.
The Henderson arguments are of more than passing interest to conflicts jurisprudence. If
we reject Professor Brilmayer's approach that the constitutional validity of interest analysis is
to be decided on the basis of domestic relevance, then we are faced with highly speculative
multistate interests competing with territorially oriented fact patterns. The interests qua inter-
ests are unverifiable. Their legitimacy cannot be checked against any norm except common
sense. That would be a difficult enough burden even if there was evidence that judges checked
out these notions with their spouses. It is a fortiori questionable when these unverifiable inter-
ests must displace the law of a jurisdiction in which the entire transaction was centered.
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TERRITORIALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
PURPOSEFULNESS
Hague has drawn heavy fire from many sources.6 Professors
Reese and Martin have, in this symposium and elsewhere, expressed
their displeasure with the "anything goes" approach.6 5 Professor Sil-
berman's provocative contribution to this symposium acknowledges
the need for constitutional limitations in cases where the state claims
a domiciliary interest in its plaintiff as the sole source of its claim to
the application of its law. She suggests that before a defendant can
be subjected to foreign law, it is necessary to establish "the purpose-
fulness of a particular party's activity in relationship to the events in
question." 6 She contends that even some of the more extreme plain-
tiff-oriented choice-of-law holdings have paid heed to the principle of
non-unilateralism even when the ostensible reason for application of
forum law was the forum's interest in its own plaintiff.67
There is no question that if the Supreme Court were to adopt
Silberman's approach it would be going a long way toward address-
ing the territorial concerns which I have expressed. I remain, how-
ever, convinced that it would not fully resolve the problem. For ex-
ample, consider my Boston motel hypothetical. If my jazz playing
neighbor were told that by playing to all hours of the morning he
was affecting my domestic tranquility in New York, and he were to
reply, "Twerski, I hate your guts; I hope your wife divorces you,"
would that not demonstrate sufficient purposefulness toward affect-
ing New York events to meet Professor Silberman's test for constitu-
tional choice of law? I would think so. It would, however, remain for
me an essentially local Massachusetts controversy to be governed by
Massachusetts law.
CONCLUSION
Hague has forced me to confront the question whether my terri-
torial approach to choice of law has constitutional dimensions. I have
concluded that it does. Before a case is subject to any choice-of-law
doctrine, the case must have an interstate character; it must be other
than a purely local transaction. The mere fact that some other state
64. E.g.,. Brilmayer, supra note 22; Davies, A Legislator's Look at Hague and Choice of
Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (1981), von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 10.
65. Martin, supra note 11; Martin, The Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 133 (1981); Reese, supra note 6; Reese, The Hague Case: An Opportunity
Lost,.10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195 (1981).
66. Silberman, supra note 10, at 119.
67. Id. at 110-14.
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can find some interest-real or imagined-in the case cannot be
enough to alter its local nature and prevent the application of the
law of the sovereign in which the transaction took place. If the op-
posing philosophy is adopted, then all cases, even the most domestic
in nature, become potential conflicts cases. This problem is not one
of unfairness to the parties alone; it goes much deeper. It focuses on
the role of law in governing the daily lives of persons who ordered
their transactions and activities under the rule of a given sovereign.
Hague pays these considerations no heed, and, for that reason, it
makes no sense.
